Distributive justice was found to be a more important predictor of two personal outcomes, pay satisfaction and job satisfaction, than procedural justice, whereas the reverse was true for two organizational outcomes-organizational commitment and subordinate's evaluation of supervisor. However, procedural and distributive justice also interacted in predicting organizational outcomes. We discuss limitations of this study and directions for future research.
Folger and Konovsky captured the key distinction regarding justice in work organizations, noting that "distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the amounts of compensation employees receive; procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the means used to determine those amounts " (1989: 115) . However, few studies have examined how both distributive and procedural justice affect outcomes (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1987a; Konovsky, Folger, & Cropanzano, 1987) . In addition, most research has focused on legal rather than work-related issues. For example, Greenberg and Folger (1983) showed that defendants viewed trial verdicts (distributions) positively if they were seen as the result of fair procedures, an effect called the "fair process effect" (cf. Musante, Gilbert, & Thibaut, 1983 ). Folger and Konovsky pointed out that this research has suggested different predictive roles for procedural and distributive justice. In particular, studies have found distributive justice to predict satisfaction with specific, personal outcomes, like case verdicts, better than procedural justice. The reverse is true, however, when people make more general evaluations of, for instance, legal institutions or their representatives (Lind & Tyler, 1988) .
In fact, the few studies that have been done in organizational settings have tended to support the notion that the predictive roles of procedural and distributive justice depend, at least in part, on the nature of the outcome in question. For example, Alexander and Ruderman (1987) found procedural justice accounted for more variance in management evaluations, job satis-faction, and perceived conflict than distributive justice. Konovsky and colleagues (1987] found that procedural justice predicted organizational commitment, but not pay satisfaction, whereas the reverse was true for distributive justice. Similarly, Folger and Konovsky (1989) found that procedural justice accounted for more variance in organizational commitment and trust in a supervisor than distributive justice, wbereas tbe reverse was true for satisfaction witb a pay raise. i Overall, tbese results suggest tbat procedural justice may be la more important predictor tban distributive justice of outcomes related to evaluating a company as an institution and its representatives, sucb as organizational commitment and trust in supervisor. In contrast, distributive justice may be a more important predictor of personal outcomes, like satisfaction witb pay level, tban procedural justice.
[ Interestingly, tbese results reflect wbat we migbt call a main effect approacb to examining tbe predictive roles of distributive and procedural justice in field research. Tbere are few studies of tbe interactive effects of tbe two types of justice. In fact, tbe existing researcb evidence about interactive effects comes from laboratory studies. For example, in a recent investigation by Greenberg (1987a) , subjects worked on a task in wbicb distributive justice (pay levels) and procedural justice (bow pay levels were determined) were manipulated. He found an interaction of tbe following form; subjects saw bigb pay levels as fair regardless of procedures but saw low pay levels as fair only when fair procedures were used. Perceptions of unfair treatment were maximized wben pay was low and procedures were unfair. Similarly, in a laboratory study, Cropanzano and Folger (1989) found tbat resentnient was bigbest wben subjects perceived tbat unfair procedures prevented tbem from receiving bigb rewards for task performance. j Botb Greenberg (1987a) and Cropanzano and Folger (1989) pointed out, bowever, tbat researcb was needed to determine wbetber tbese laboratory interactions generalize to organizational settings. An attempt at suqb generalization was tbe focus of our researcb. Anotber key researcb question was wbetber existing tbeory allows for a precise prediction regarding tbe form sucb interactions may take. We used referent cognitions tbeoryj (Folger, 1986) to derive just sucb a prediction.
Briefly, according to referent cognitions tbeory, individuals evaluate tbeir work experiences by reflecting on "wbat migbt bave been" under different circumstances and conditions (Folger, 1986) . One way erriployees migbt accomplisb sucb a comparison would be to cognitively simulate bow tbeir current work situation migbt be different bad tbeir organization used fairer procedures. In fact, Cropanzano and Folger (1989) suggested' tbat referent cognitions tbeory offers a potential conceptual framework for tbe interactive effects of distributive and procedural justice.
Tbey argued tbat tbe tbeory predicts tbat resentment sbould be maximized in organizations wben outcomes are poor-distributive justice is low-and tbe procedures used by a decision maker, like a supervisor, are unfair. In effect, referent cognitions tbeory suggests tbat employees will contrast tbis situation to tbe more positive outcomes tbat tbey would bave obtained bad tbe decision maker used fair allocation procedures. On tbe otber band, referent cognitions tbeory predicts tbat wben people perceive procedures to be fair, resentment will be minimal, even when distributive justice is low. Under sucb conditions, it would be more difficult for employees to envision alternative fairer procedures tbat could bave led to better outcomes.
To test tbis interaction pattern in a field setting, we surveyed a group of bank employees. In addition to measuring procedural and distributive justice, we assessed perceptions of two important personal outcomes, pay and job satisfaction, and two organizational outcomes: organizational commitment and subordinate's evaluation of supervisor. If Cropanzano and application of referent cognitions tbeory is correct, we would expect tbat tbe evaluation of tbese outcomes would be most negative wben botb distributive and procedural justice are low. But we would expect positive evaluations wben procedural justice is bigb, regardless of tbe level of distributive justice.
A more speculative prediction is tbat tbe interaction pattern referent cognitions tbeory suggests will be clearest wben tbe focus is on organizational, as opposed to personal, outcomes. Because tbe former focus on tbe sources of tbe procedures tbat affect employees, sucb as supervisors and tbe employing organization as an institution, tbey provide a clearer target for retaliation tban outcomes of a more personal nature. In otber words, allowing employees to evaluate an organization as an institution gives tbem tbe opportunity to blame tbe parties responsible for creating tbe rules of tbe game-tbe unfair procedures-tbat have resulted in a lack of distributive justice. Referent cognitions tbeory suggests tbat employees' resentment is not only a function of low distributive justice, but also of tbe opportunity to blame "misfortune" on tbe actions of otbers ratber tban on tbeir own bebavior (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989) .
Finally, sbould tbe interactions we predicted fail to materialize, we determined tbat our focus would sbift to tbe interpretation of main effects. In view of prior researcb (e.g., Alexander & Ruderman, 1987) , we predicted tbat distributive and procedural justice would eacb produce strong main effects for a variety of outcomes. Given Folger and Konovsky's (1989) and Konovsky and colleagues' (1987) results, bowever, we expected procedural justice to produce a stronger main effect in predicting organizational outcomes tban distributive justice. We expected tbe reverse to be true witb personal outcomes.
METHODS

Respondents
Surveys were distributed to 1,100 employees of a midwestern bank and completed on company time. Completed surveys were returned anonymously in sealed envelopes. In total, 675 employees completed tbe survey. resulting in a response rate of 61 percent. Tbe respondents' mean age was 33.8 years (s.d. = 12.1); tbeir mean company tenure was 6.3 years (s.d. = 5.8); and 74 percent were women. Tbese respondent demograpbics compared favorably witb company statistics for tbe work force as wboje, suggesting tbat problems resulting from response bias were unlikely to be a major tbreat. In tbe total work force, 68 percent of tbe employees were women, witb an average age of 34.6 years and an average company tenure of 6.9 years.
Measures
Predictors were measures of global distributive and procedural justice. Criterion variables were two measures reflecting evaluations of tbe surveyed organization and its representatives and two measures of satisfaction witb personal outcomes.
; Distributive justice. We used five of tbe six items from Price and Mueller's (1986) Distributive Justice Index. Tbese items ask workers to indicate tbe extent to wbicb tbey bave been fairly rewarded in view of tbeir responsibilities, experience, job stress, effort, and performance. Rewards in tbe index are defined broadly, witb money, praise, and recognition all being listed as examples. An example of tbe item format is as follows: "How fair bas [company name] been in rewarding you wben you consider tbe amount of effort tbat you put into your work?" ( 1 = very unfair, 5 = very'fair).
Procedural justice. We constructed a four-item procedural justice scale tbat used tbe same basic format and five-point response scale as tbeiDistributive Justice Index. Respondents indicated tbe extent to wbicb tbe general procedures used to communicate performance feedback, determine, pay increases, and evaluate performance and promotability were fair. ' Organizational outcomes. Organizational commitment was assessed using four items from Cook and Wall's (1980) commitment scale. Tbese items ask workers to express tbeir agreement or disagreement witb various statements (e.g., "I feel myself to be a part of tbis company"), using five-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Tbe second organizational outcome, subordinate's evaluation of supervisor, was assessed witb a single item: "Overall, I tbink my boss is a poor performer" (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). Several national probability studies (e.g, Quinn & Staines, 1979) bave previously used an essentially equivalent item. j Personal outcomes. We used tbree items to assess pay JeveJ satis/action. Two of tbe items used five-point agree-disagree formats; tbese were: "Tbe pay for my job is excellent" and "I am satisfied witb my current pay." Tbe tbird item asked respondents "bow tbey felt" about tbeir pay (7 = deligbted, 1 = terrible; cf. Andrews & Witbey, 1976) . Since tbey bad different measurement scales, we standardized tbese tbree items before combining tbem.
We assessed tbe second personal outcome, job satisfaction, using tbe five-item scale developed for tbe Quality of Employment Surveys (Quinn & Staines, 1979) . Tbe items ask about general reactions to a job, sucb as, "All in all, bow satisfied would you say you are witb your job?" i Table 1 presents means, correlations, and reliability coefficients, wbere applicable, for all study variables. Tbe reliabilities for multi-item scales were generally very good, witb alpbas ranging from .75 to .92. One concern tbat migbt be raised, bowever, is tbe correlation between procedural and distributive justice (.67). To belp allay tbis concern, we would make tbree points. First, prior researcb bas successfully sbown tbat tbese scales predict different dependent measures, suggesting tbat tbey are independent constructs. Second, prominent researcbers bave claimed tbat altbougb tbey are separate constructs, in practice a sizable correlation sbould be found between tbem (e.g., Folger, 1987) . For example, Folger cited an important study by Tyler (1984) in wbicb tbe correlation between distributive and procedural justice was .77. Tbird, we conducted an empirical analysis tbat sbeds some additional ligbt on tbis issue.R
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
egression Analysis Results
Separate three-step, bierarcbical regression analyses were performed for eacb outcome variable. At step 1, we entered five control variables: salary, job type, age, gender, and tenure. Staines, Pottick, and Fudge (1986) cautioned tbat tbese types of variables need to be controlled for, given tbeir general potential to inflate or suppress relations between otber variables. Salary and job type were of special concern, given tbeir potential to affect tbe particular outcome variables used in tbis study.
As Table 2 sbows, age significantly predicted pay level satisfaction, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment. Consistent witb earlier researcb findings (Weaver, 1980) , our finding was tbat older workers tended to bave bigber commitment and satisfaction tban younger workers. Job type also significantly predicted job satisfaction, evaluation of supervisor, and organizational commitment, witb managers being more positive tban clerical employees.
At step 2, distributive and procedural justice were entered. Botb types of justice were significant predictors of eacb outcome variable. Consistent witb Folger and Konovsky's (1989) contentions, bowever, distributive justicê Podsakoff and Organ (1986) reviewed techniques that address method variance, including a procedure called the single factor approach. The logic of this approach is that if method variance accounts for the relations between two or more variables, a factor analysis should yield a single global (method) factor. Since researchers have generally viewed this approach as weak but as possibly providing some useful information, we combined it with a stronger confirmatory factor analysis, using LISREL VI (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1985) , which tests models that increase in complexity. The least complex model examined, the single factor model, did not fit the data as well as more complex models; the six-factor model with independent variables for procedural and distributive justice and our four dependent variables fit the data significantly better than all other models tested (Bentler-Bonett index = .927 [Bentler & Bonett. 1980 ]; Tucker-Lewis index = .933 [Tucker & Lewis, 1973] Step 3 AR^ for interaction of procedural and distributive justice tended to be a more important predictor of personal outcomes (pay and job satisfaction) than procedural justice. In addition, procedural justice was a more important predictor of both organizational outcomes than distributive justice (see Table 2 ).Î n step 3, we entered the interaction of distributive and procedural justice. As Table 2 shows, the interaction terms for both evaluation of supervisor and organizational commitment were significant. When plotted (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 1983) , both outcomes yielded the same interaction pattern.
Following a reviewer's suggestion, we conducted our regression analyses again, entering distributive and procedural justice on separate steps to more closely examine their relative predictive power. The results of tbese analyses were consistent with those given in Table 2 ; procedural justice was a stronger predictor of organizational outcomes tban distributive justice, with the reverse being true for personal outcomes. Specifically, witb procedural justice controlled, distributive justice accounted for an additional 5 percent of tbe variance in job satisfaction and 14 percent of tbe variance in pay level satisfaction; wben tbe order of entry was reversed, procedural justice only accounted for an additional 1 and 2 percent for the two personal outcomes. With distributive justice controlled, procedural justice accounted for an additional 3 percent of the variance in supervisor evaluation and 6 percent of the variance in organizational commitment. Wben tbe order of entry was reversed, distributive justice only accounted for an additional 1 and 3 percent. To illustrate this pattern, we present the interaction for organizational commitment in Figure 1 , which shows that although employees who felt that procedures were fair tended to have higher levels of organizational commitment than those who felt procedures were unfair, this gap was much larger when distributive justice was low. Specifically, when procedural justice was low, organizational commitment varied considerably as a function of distributive justice. When procedural justice was high, however, organizational commitment varied little as a function of distributive justice. Again, an identical interaction pattern emerged for evaluation of supervisor.^!
DISCUSSION I Distributive and Procedural Justice as Predictors
Our finding that both distributive and procedural justice are important predictors of work outcomes underscores recent admonitions for organiza-A reviewer raised a concern about tbe reliability of our single-item supervisor evaluation measure. To address this issue, we corrected tbe correlation matrix for measurement error and conducted the analysis again using the corrected matrix. Wbere possible, we used alpha coefficients for the correction. For tbe supervisor evaluation measure itself, we used test-retest correlations for a similar measure (cf. Quinn & Staines, 1979) as tbe reliability estimate. The interaction term was corrected for unreliability using procedures outlined by Borbristedt and (continued) tional researchers to examine both types of justice (Greenberg, 1987a,b) , We also found, as expected, that distributive justice tended to be a stronger predictor of personal outcomes than procedural justice, whereas the reverse was true for organizational outcomes. The fairness of a firm's procedures may have a greater impact on organizational commitment than the fairness of personal outcomes that workers receive, perhaps because procedures define the organization's capacity to treat employees fairly. Thus, if they see procedures as fair, employees may view the organization positively, even if they are currently dissatisfied with such personal outcomes as a low pay raise. In contrast, a pay cut may cripple an employee financially, and a larger paycheck will buy more, regardless of whether procedures were fair or not (cf. Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Konovsky et al, 1987) . Our findings are congruent with research in the legal arena that suggests that distributive and procedural justice have different predictive roles depending on whether the outcome in question is personal or reflects more general evaluations of legal institutions or their representatives (Lind & Tyler, 1988) . However, we also found that distributive and procedural justice had significant interactive effects on our organizational outcomes, subordinate's evaluation of supervisor and organizational commitment. Consistent with Cropanzano and application of referent cognitions theory, these interactions revealed that the combination of unfair procedures and low distributive justice produced the lowest ratings. In contrast, fair procedures produced high commitment and supervisor evaluations, regardless of the level of distributive justice. Advocates of referent cognitions theory argued that, under conditions of procedural fairness, employees will find it difficult to envision that more positive alternative outcomes could have occurred.
Referent cognitions theory may also help explain why we found interaction effects for organizational, but not personal, outcomes. According to the theory, employee resentment requires not only low distributive justice, but also the ability to identify other people and the procedures that they use as the source of poor outcomes (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989) . Thus, organizational outcomes may represent a clear target for blame, whereas personal outcomes do not. By definition, organizational outcomes make salient the institutional sources of the procedures that affect employees.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
One of the most basic limitations of the present study is its exclusive reliance on cross-sectional, self-report data. This reliance precludes us from making strong causal statements about our results. The use of a longitudinal design would improve the ability to make causal statements. In addition, our Marwell (1978) . Tbe results yielded virtually the same effects as the original regression equation, including a significant interaction term. approach raises the issue of common method variance. Although we can at least partially allay concerns about method variance in our particular case (see the Results section), we would also encourage future justice researchers to take steps to avoid method variance problems in field settings', by, for instance, collecting multiple measures.
[ Concern might also arise about the small magnitude of our interaction effects. Since interaction terms are not independent of main effects in regression analyses, Cohen and Cohen (1983) recommended that researchers test simple main effect models before entertaining more complicated interactive models. This procedure tends to underestimate the amount; of variance for which interaction terms truly account. Furthermore, the literature on regression analysis provides several cautions about interpreting t;he theoretical or practical significance of interaction terms on the basis of j the proportions of variance explained (cf. Champoux & Peters, 1987; Pedhazur, 1982; Stone & Hollenbeck, 1984) . Apparently, a key issue is not how much variance is explained, but whether the increment is statistically significant, indicating that the relationship in question is being moderated. However, to understand the actual nature of an interaction effect, researchers should plot separate regression equations for different values of the moderator^ variable and examine the resulting pattern for its theoretical or practical significance (Stone & Hollenbeck, 1984) . This is the approach we took in this research. Still, we would suggest that researchers be sensitive to the limitations of moderated regression analysis and follow the recommendations that have been made to minimize them.
Finally, a basic direction for future research is to determine whether personal and organizational outcomes other than those examined here and in previous research will yield similar predictive patterns for distributive and procedural justice. More research is also needed to explain why distributive and procedural justice may differentially affect personal and organizational outcomes. To address this issue may require a better understanding of how personal and organizational outcomes differ. As Cropanzano and Folger (1989) suggested, referent cognitions theory may provide a useful guiding framework for such efforts.
